The Emergence and Future of Central Counterparties (joint with Cyril Monnet)
The Economics of Cryptocurrencies -- Bitcoin and Beyond (joint with Jonathan Chiu)
Blockchain-based Settlement for Asset Trading (joint with Jonathan Chiu)
Work in Progress
Customized vs. Standardized Contracts -- What can be centrally cleared? (joint with Cyril Monnet)
Trading Dynamics with Adverse Selection and Search: Market Freeze, Intervention and Recovery (joint with Jonathan Chiu), Review of Economic Studies, 83, pp. 969-1000. (Additional Material)
Compensation par contrepartie centrale et assurance contre le risque systémique sur les marchés dérivés de gré à gré (joint with Cyril Monnet), Revue d'économie financière, 109, pp. 179-197. (English Version: Central Counterparty Clearing and Systemic Risk Insurance in OTC Derivatives Markets)
Efficient Contract Enforcement (joint with Cyril Monnet and Erwan Quintin), Economic Theory, 55, pp. 161-183.
(In)efficient Investment in Financial Market Infrastructure: The Role of Governance Structures, Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, 1, pp. 55-73.
Optimal Clearing Arrangements for Financial Trades (joint with Cyril Monnet and Ted Temzelides), Journal of Financial Economics, 103, pp. 189-203.
What Banks Do and Markets Don't: Cross-subsidization (joint with Jim MacGee), European Economic Review, 53, pp. 222-236.
A Dynamic Model of Settlement (joint with Cyril Monnet and Ted Temzelides), Journal of Economic Theory, 142, pp. 233-246.
Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing When Enforcement is a Decision Variable, Journal of Economic Theory, 127, pp. 34-60.
Guess what: It's the Settlements! (joint with Cyril Monnet), Journal of Banking and Finance, 31, pp. 3013-3033.
Risk Sharing through Financial Markets with Endogenous Enforcement of Trades, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30, pp. 1987-2014.
Differentiability of the Efficient Frontier when Commitment to Risk Sharing is Limited, Topics in Macroeconomics, 6, Article 10.
Solvency Regulation for Insurance against Large (Aggregate) Risk (joint with Jim MacGee and Antoine Martin)
Optimal Collateral Policies for Central Counterparties (joint with Cyril Monnet)
A Note on Incentive Feasibility when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
On the Modigliani-Miller Theorem in Infinite Horizon Incomplete Markets Economies