Should Star Performers Lead or Anchor Their Teams? Sequential Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment

Collective efforts often rely on high-capacity “stars”—star employees, lead investors, or major donors—whose participation disproportionately determines success. Is it better to engage them early to set direction, or later to ensure completion? We investigate this strategic design problem experimentally, where collective success requires coordination on both direction and effort. We find that sequential engagement significantly outperforms simultaneous action, following a clear heuristic: stars should lead when the broader team is disorganized (to focus attention) but anchor when the team is already organized (to resolve effort failure). Regardless of when star engagement occurs, groups tend to support the majority’s preferred action when it is clear. Disorganized groups, in contrast, look to the preferences of the star for guidance. Finally, groups converge towards more equitable outcomes than equilibria imply, with the star taking on a disproportionate, but not excessive, share of costs. The timing that maximizes success also maximizes the payoffs of both the star and majority members, suggesting that managers can focus on effectiveness, relying on cooperative norms to prevent excessive free-riding and ensure fairness.